An amazing piece in the Boston Review (props to FP Passport for the heads up) on the issue of development in failing and otherwise troubled states. Paul Collier’s anchor article offers the most striking commentary; that wealthy states are in best position to provide a solution to the security dilemma found in failing states, even through military intervention. The other gem (or gems) in this feature are the thoughtful responses from more than a few heavy hitters in the World Politics/Development/Academia spheres: Krasner, Easterly, Diamond (Larry, not Jared), Miguel, McGovern, and Birdsall. Thoughtful and provocative discussions all around.
Asks Moises Naim, Editor in Chief of Foreign Policy, in his article highlighting the silence of the Muslim world on China’s crackdown on the Uighur population. Just as there was a dearth of support and cries from Riyadh, Baghdad, and Tehran during the genocide of Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, so too is there the same deafining silence in the Muslim world about the violence in Xinjiang provence. The core of Naim’s argument comes down to these points:
“As Foreign Policy has reported, in different countries, mullahs, imams, and assorted clerics have found the time to issue fatwas condemning among other practices, Pokémon cartoons, total nudity during sex for married couples, and the use of vaccines against polio, not to mention Salman Rushdie. They have yet to find the time to say anything about China’s practices toward Uighurs. The same applies to the Arab League, governments of Muslim countries (where are the 11 ambassadors of the countries that issued their angry protests to the Danish government? [about cartons depicting the prophet Muhammad]), and Muslim organizations in Europe and Asia. They have either been mute or their reaction has been too little, too late.”
Do you ever wonder how international rules are embedded in the daily practice of world politics? Here’s one poignant example-yesterday’s article from Amos Guioria & Foreign Policy. Not only is Guioria’s argument succinct, covering the relevant principles and rules of the law of armed conflict, but demonstrates how the politics of civil societies and the real complexities of the battlefield all enter into the decision to use force against non-state actors.
This article, of course, references the story reported by the Wall Street Journal (and others) about the recently-cancelled CIA program designed to capture or kill Al Qaida leaders. Yes, Dick Cheney dramatically exceeded his authority as Vice President when he advised the CIA to lie/not disclose the program to Congress. I suspect that his reasoning was based on the premises that (a) the CIA can operate outside the rules of armed conflict and (b) that the covert program would be leaked if Congress were ever appraised of about the plan. In the first case, Cheney and the legal advisers of the Bush administration have consistently held incorrect (bordering on the immature) understandings of the international rules governing armed conflict. The evolving nature of warfare requires that any actor, especially those representing a government or organization, that enters the battlefield is held to a set of rules and standards about when and how to use force. These are not only espoused in the voluminous body of that is the Law of Armed Conflict, but also enshrined in U.S. domestic law and U.S. Military rules and regulations. In the second case, there was concern amongst Cheney and others in the administration that members of Congress would leak the existence of the program, and thus secrecy was required. Again Cheney’s reading of the U.S. law is rather liberal; but his real concern appears to be that, if informed, members of Congress would leak the existence of the program to the public.
So what? Is any thoughtful person that naive to think that any member of Al Qaida, from Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri to the financiers down to the lowly drivers think that the U.S. isn’t trying to actively capture or kill them? Members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and others don’t cry foul at Israel’s policies in this regard.
In the end, in spite of the actions of VP Cheney and others in the former administration, does this mean that the program was wrong? Absolutely not; so long as the CIA teams were to operate within the rules of war once they entered the battle space in their efforts to capture or kill members of Al Qaida. Strikes from Predator drones have (unfortunately) killed far more civilians than Al Qaida & Taliban these past eight years. As good as the Predators are, I’m fairly confident that CIA teams would be able to make faster decisions in real time to discriminate between combatant and non-combatant in the battle space. Predators invariably violate state sovereignty, just as the CIA teams would in attempting to capture or kill individuals who are a part of the Al Qaida network. Modern armed conflict, from inter-state war to the use of force against non-state actors, is an extraordinarily complex affair. The best practices for governments are those that base their policies and actions in rules (the hallmark of civil society), and then balances these policies and actions against the realities of the battle space. The case of the U.S. and its now-terminated CIA program of targeted assassinations against Al Qaida is just another example of the failings of the American policy in recent years; a good idea, but terrible execution.
Unfortunately, I haven’t had a lot of time to write on this subject (sounds strange, since I’m not teaching during the summer…). What I can say is that its become apparent that the security dilemma between Han and Uighurs in Xinjiang, China has deteriorated to the point that (a) groups of both Uighuer and Han Chinese have taken to arming themselves and engaging in mob-style violence an (b) the Chinese government are having a difficult time suppressing violence amongst the groups, despite their better efforts.
The consequences of this breakdown of security are typical, however. Groups will become more polarized, especially as each group’s leaders and masses perceive that the Chinese government lacks the ability to restore order and provide for a sustainable solution to the conflict. In addition, repressive police tactics employed by the Chinese authorities, while achieving some measure of short-term stability, will also foster enmity amongst hard-liners of either side who feel that the conflict has not been resolved. Finally, unless the Chinese government is willing and able to set up some sort of post-conflict means of resolving the underlying issues to the conflict, future conflict is likely to break out again due to a variety of proximate causes. In addition, future conflicts between Uighers and Han will become more violent.
Three articles-an editorial, a photo essay, and a podcast all have caught my eyes in recent days-be sure to embrace each of them.
How China Wins and Loses Xinjiang (Foreign Policy)
“The Chinese government can put down a riot — but its heavy-handed tactics ensure that ethnic tensions will keep simmering.”
Who are the Uighers? (Foreign Policy)
“What motivates China’s restless Muslim minority”
Uighers and China’s Social Justice Problem (Council on Foreign Relations)
TED Fellow Sophal Ear shares the compelling story of his family’s escape from Cambodia under the rule of the Khmer Rouge. He recounts his mother’s cunning and determination to save her children.
Just in case you needed a glimpse into some of the darkest places in the world; “Portraits of Instability” (via Foreign Policy). Perhaps the most striking statistic from all of these cases is that of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) pictured above:
“The magnitude of crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is staggering. Some 45,000 people die every month, the International Rescue Committee estimates, putting the total dead since 1998 at 5.4 million — more than in any conflict since World War II. All but 0.4 percent of the deaths come from preventable diseases and malnutrition — a phenomenon that has arisen due to horrid conditions in displacement camps that lack infrastructure, basic supplies, and proper medical care. The displaced children seen here, in a camp in eastern Congo, are among the 1 million displaced from North Kivu province alone.”
For a more in depth accounting of the humanitarian crisis in The DRC, read this report from the International Committee of the Red Cross
What will you tell your children about what you did to combat genocide and humanitarian suffering in Africa….?
Here’s a collection of required readings so that we may better wrap our heads around the emerging ethnic violence in China.
Uighers and China’s Xinjiang Region (Council on Foreign Relations)
Unrest in China (Rising Powers blog/Foreign Policy Association)
China’s Latest Tibet (Foreign Policy)
But perhaps most poignant piece on ethnic conflict comes from the FP Passport blog (by way of Andrew Sullivan and Robert Kaplan) In reporting on ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, Kaplan contends that the only strategy that assured victory for the government over the rebel LTTE (Tamil Tigers) was the use of “extreme and unsavory” methods. A chilling, and largely accurate description of events for those of use who study identity-based violence and genocide.
Ok, so I love maps. That said, the ILGA report highlights how identity-based discrimination and persecution is still rampant around the world.
“India decriminalized homosexuality today, marking a major victory for gay rights activists worldwide. But there’s still a long way to go, according to international watchdog ILGA.
Being gay in India carried the risk of a lifelong prison term, reports the ILGA’s May 2009 world map of gay rights. At least five other countries — Mauritania, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Iran — substitute the death penalty in place of imprisonment. Only six countries afford gay couples marriage with full legal rights: South Africa, Spain, Belgium, Norway, Sweden and Canada.”
The second set of incidents involving racist attacks on minority populations in advanced, industrial/post-industrial democracies in recent weeks. The other was the forced expulsion of 100 Romanians in Northern Ireland, after they had been harassed to the point where they fled their homes in Belfast. Also, the Economist has a story this week on the link between economic downturn, protectionism, and the opposition to migrants in wealthy countries. All of this points towards the fact that racism is a multifaceted, political/economic/social/historical problem that must be confronted each and every time we see it. I couldn’t agree more with the protestor in the picture, and these events highlight how far all of our societies have to go in addressing issues of equity and diversity.
The Times of India reports a total of 81 confirmed attacks on Indian citizens, mainly students, in Australia since May 23. The New South Wales state government and police admit a reluctance among Indian populations to report crimes against them, alluding to what is potentially a much larger figure. The attacks are believed to be both “recessionist” and racist in nature. The violence has prompted a patrol of Indian men along Melbourne’s suburban train system to protect other Indians from attack.
The attacks were condemned by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd last month, who insisted that efforts to make international students feel safer would be undertaken at both the state and national levels. Australia currently plays host to over 93,000 Indian students and its education institutions fear a significant drop in attendees from the sub-continent if the current climate of ‘curry-bashing’ is not effectively dealt with. Victoria Police Chief Commissioner Simon Overland released figures showing 1,447 reported cases of robbery and assault against Indians in 2008-2009, up from 1,083 the year before.
WILLIAM WEST/AFP/Getty Images
One of my favortie scholars on armed conflict, territory, and identity-Monica Duffy Toft-is guest posting for Stephen Walt this week. Students in my IB History class read sections of Toft’s “The Geography of Ethnic Violence” during our seminars on the Causes, Practices, and Effects of war. See her latest article below (via Walt-Foreign Policy)
By Monica Duffy Toft
As American troops pull back from Iraq’s urban areas, a central question is whether Iraq’s forces will be able to secure the peace. If history is any guide, Iraq’s security forces face a challenging task. Ending civil wars and keeping them ended is not easy. Iraq faces three critical risk factors.
First, the violence was ended by a negotiated settlement. Iraq is a unique case when it comes to the emergence of civil war, which started with invasion and occupation by an outside power: the United States and its coalition partners. Yet rather than unite and attack the invaders cum occupiers, Iraqis turned on themselves. Stopping this self-destruction has entailed a series of negotiations and agreements between the parties to form a government and rule the country. In essence, no one side emerged victorious (as most recently by the government in Sri Lanka); rather, a negotiated settlement of sorts was put into place in Iraq, with each of the main factions guaranteed a say in running the government.
On the face of it, negotiated settlements are desirable outcomes for ending violence. Violence is stopped and each party is guaranteed a voice in the government; it seems more democratic. Yet this equity in governance comes at a price: negotiated settlements turn out to be the most precarious ending to civil wars. They are twice as likely to break down than are military victories, and the recurred war that results is often even longer and bloodier than the first war. In the longer term, Sri Lanka is likely to stabilize while Iraq is not. This is the case because for negotiated settlements to work, they require trust between the contracting parties and continual negotiation and bargaining. When tensions run deep, such bargaining and comprise are difficult. What we find is that these settlements hold for one or two rounds of elections, with the elections functioning as part of the negotiated process, but often break down thereafter. Why? Because one party or both becomes frustrated that it has not won (enough) parliamentary seats, leadership positions, or desired policies. Rather than pursue the ballot box one more time, they take out their guns and challenge the system.
There are exceptions. One is El Salvador, which suffered a long and brutal civil war that ended in a negotiated settlement in 1992. It has remained at peace, and in fact, the candidate for the former rebels, the Farabundo Martî, recently won the presidency. This bodes well for democracy in El Salvador. However, such an outcome will be more difficult to achieve in Iraq. The reason is the second critical risk factor in Iraq, which is sectarian divisions, a risk factor absent in El Salvador, where the fight was class-based, not ethnic, religious, or linguistic.
Divisions based on identity are risk factors for a number of reasons. First, most identities are born in bloodshed and in opposition to an “other.” This means that when stories of the birth of the nation or religion are told and retold, they often invoke an enemy that must be overcome. For the Serbs, it is the nasty Ottomans or Muslims; for the Chechens, it is Moscow’s imperial yoke; and for the Shia in Iraq, it is historically the Sunnis. Such histories of fear, hatred and violence are difficult to overcome and almost impossible to erase. Thus, when political power is divided up, these identities come to the fore and often play a role in how power is divided and administered. The Shii-Sunni division is real, and it will continue to play out in Iraqi politics. Already there are warning signs, including the dominance of Shia in the security apparatus (notably the Ministry of Interior) and the lack of progress in integrating the Sunni-dominated Awakening Council members in the security forces.
A final critical risk factor is the geographical distribution of Iraqis, with Kurds dominant in the north, the Shia in the southeast, and Sunnis in the west. Living in enclaves affords them greater autonomy to not only run their own affairs, but challenge the state. Ethnic groups that are concentrated in regions of a country and are also a majority of that region’s population are three times more likely to engage in violence than those that are dispersed or constitute minorities.
One bit of good news is Baghdad. Not only is the city intermingled with different populations, but urbanization has a dampening effect on ethnic violence. Nevertheless, years of violence have segregated neighborhoods, and even countries with intermingled capitals undergo serious challenges to centralized state authority (consider Belgium).
Taken alone, these risk factors might not tip the balance. In combination, it’s a different story. States experiencing civil wars ended by negotiated settlement, with distrust and fear among the dominant identity groups that are concentrated into separate enclaves are difficult to manage even in well established democracies. The likelihood Iraq will emerge as a consolidated democracy is slim. More likely, either Iraq will divide, or a new strong-man — Shii or Sunni –will emerge to keep the country together.
Monica Duffy Toft is Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School and the author of The Geography of Ethnic Violence and Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars.
QASSEM ZEIN/AFP/Getty Images
